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The Appellants’ (“Counties”) Complaint raises both facial and “as-applied” 
constitutional challenges, contrary to what the Counties now appear to be arguing.  For 
the Counties’ appeal, this is an inconvenient fact.  Because all claims of the Counties’ 
pleading are considered to determine whether the Counties’ case was correctly dismissed, 
the Counties cannot challenge the district court’s ruling by limiting their focus to facial 
claims while ignoring their claims that challenge the same statutes as-applied.   
The Counties’ claims, even their facial claims, cannot proceed without exhaustion 
of administrative remedies, which, according to the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes, 
properly occurs before the Utah State Tax Commission (“Commission”).  The Counties’ 
claims are also not ripe for review because they do not present a justiciable case and 
controversy. 
In view of this, it is unclear why the Counties have chosen to appeal the district 
court’s dismissal when certain of the Counties have also raised and are pursuing the same 
constitutional claims in several matters now pending either before a district court tax 
judge or the Commission.2  In those cases, the correct procedure should have been 
                                              
2 The following pending cases were appealed by Salt Lake County from the Commission 
to the district court to resolve Salt Lake County’s constitutional challenge to the 
Threshold Law:  Salt Lake Cty. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, et al., Case No. 180902758; 
Salt Lake Cty. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, et al., Case No. 180902754; Salt Lake Cty. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm’n, et al., Case No. 180902757; Salt Lake Cty. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm’n, et al., Case No. 180902759.  
The following additional cases are currently pending before the Commission and involve 
challenges to the Valuation and Allocation Laws:  Appeal No. 17-977, filed June 19, 
2017 (SkyWest, Airlines Inc. v. Prop. Tax. Div.; Iron Cty. v. Prop. Tax Div. ex rel. 
SkyWest Airlines Inc.; Washington Cty. v. Prop. Tax Div. ex rel. SkyWest Airlines, Inc.; 
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followed as prescribed by the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes for resolving tax 
appeals.  Here, by contrast, the Counties deviate from the proper procedure.  Recognizing 
this, the district court correctly stopped the Counties from circumventing the Commission 
and Utah’s long-established administrative process—the constitutional system prescribed 
to resolve tax challenges—and from bringing their claims in the district court in the first 
instance. 
This Court should do the same, and affirm the district court’s order granting the 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings submitted by Delta Air Lines, Inc. and SkyWest 
Airlines, Inc. (collectively the “Airlines”), and partially granting the Motion to Dismiss 
presented by the State. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the district court correctly dismiss the Counties’ claims regarding Utah 
Code § 59-2-201(4) (“Valuation Law”) and § 59-2-804 (“Allocation Law”) for the 
Counties’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 
a. Standard of Review.  “The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
is reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss.”  
Thimmes v. Utah State Univ., 2001 UT App 93, ¶ 4, 22 P.3d 257.  “A 
district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss . . . presents a question of law 
that we review for correctness.”  Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Salt Lake Cty. v. Prop. Tax Div. ex rel. SkyWest Airlines, Inc.); Appeal No. 17-979, filed 
June 22, 2017 (Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Prop. Tax Div.; Salt Lake Cty. v. Prop. Tax Div. ex 
rel. Delta Air Lines, Inc.); Appeal No. 17-1163, filed June 22, 2017 (Salt Lake Cty. v. 
Prop. Tax Div. ex rel. Frontier Airlines, Inc.); Appeal No. 17-1160, filed June 22, 2017 
(Salt Lake Cty. v. Prop. Tax Div. ex rel. JetBlue Airways Corp.); (R. 287, 294, 817). 
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L.C., 2010 UT 29, ¶ 10, 232 P.3d 999 (citations omitted).  “[I]t is well 
established that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, 
even if it differs from that stated by the trial court.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
b. Preservation of Issue.  The Airlines are responding to the Counties’ appeal 
and their asserted preservation of the issue. 
2. Did the district court correctly dismiss the Counties’ claims regarding Utah 
Code § 59-2-1007(2)(b) (“Threshold Law”) because they were not ripe for review?  
a. Standard of Review.  “The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
is reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss.”  
Thimmes, 2001 UT App 93, ¶ 4.  “A district court’s grant of a motion to 
dismiss . . . presents a question of law that we review for correctness.”  
Osguthorpe, 2010 UT 29, ¶ 10 (citations omitted).  “[I]t is well established 
that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even if it 
differs from that stated by the trial court.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
b. Preservation of Issue.  The Airlines are responding to the Counties’ appeal 
and their asserted preservation of the issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
1. Facts and Procedural History. 
The Counties’ Complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
State.  (R. 1-30).  The Complaint alleges that the Valuation, Allocation, and Threshold 
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Laws (the “Challenged Statutes”) are unconstitutional on their face and as-applied.  (R. 1-
30). 
The State moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (the “State’s 
Motion”), asserting that the Counties’ claims were not ripe.  (R. 461-76). 
The Airlines moved to intervene because the disposition of the lawsuit would 
directly impact the Airlines’ property interest.  (R. 321-47).  The district court granted the 
Airlines’ motion on January 29, 2018.  (R. 600-06).3  The Airlines joined in the States’ 
Motion, and also moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the Counties 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the Commission before seeking 
judicial review (the “Airlines’ Motion”).  (R. 562-87).  The district court heard argument 
on these motions on February 20, 2018 (R. 735-36), and later received simultaneous 
supplemental briefing on April 19, 2018.  (R. 791-99, 803-09, 813-22). 
2. Disposition in the District Court. 
The district court’s order dated June 22, 2018: (1) granted the State’s Motion with 
respect to the Threshold Law, finding that it was not ripe for review, (2) denied the 
State’s Motion with respect to the Valuation and Allocation Laws,4 and (3) granted the 
Airlines’ Motion, dismissing the Counties’ remaining claims concerning the Valuation 
and Allocation Laws for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  (R. 913-15).  The 
Counties filed a notice of appeal on July 20, 2018.  (R. 917-20).  This Court retained the 
case. 
                                              
3 The Counties do not appeal the Airlines’ intervention. 
4 This denial has not been cross-appealed by the State. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Correctly Dismissed The Counties’ Claims Regarding The 
Valuation And Allocation Laws For Failure To Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies. 
The Counties’ appeal focuses only on their facial challenges as though the 
Complaint contained nothing more.  By doing this, the Counties hope to avoid the 
requirement to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.  But 
the Complaint plainly alleges both facial and “as-applied” challenges.  The Counties 
cannot ignore this fact.  The Counties’ pleading controls, and the Counties’ facial claims 
should not be viewed in isolation.  The Court must consider all allegations of the 
Complaint to determine if the district court properly dismissed the Counties’ claims. 
Based on all the Complaint’s claims and allegations, factual findings are required 
to determine whether a constitutional violation is present, or whether the matter may be 
resolved on alternative grounds that would obviate the need to address the constitutional 
claims.  See Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ¶ 93, 234 P.3d 1115 (recognizing Utah 
Supreme Court’s “obligation to avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to 
do so”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Recognizing this, the district court correctly 
held that the Counties are required to exhaust their administrative remedies at the 
Commission.  
II. The Cases Pending In The District Court Do Not Satisfy The Case And 
Controversy And Exhaustion Requirements. 
Even if the Counties’ claims only involve a facial challenge (and they do not), the 
Complaint would still fail to satisfy Utah’s “ripeness” standards and would have been 
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properly dismissed for lack of a case and controversy.  Perhaps recognizing this, the 
Counties cite to the four Commission cases which Appellant Salt Lake County appealed 
to the district court on the Threshold Law (Cty. Br., pp. 23-25), saying it is “senseless” to 
require exhaustion in this case when “there is no administrative remedy to exhaust 
because the statute under challenge prevents administrative adjudication in the first 
instance.”  (Cty. Br., pp. 24).  But affirming the district court’s decision does not prevent 
the Counties’ constitutional issues from ever being heard; it only requires the Counties to 
complete the administrative process at the Commission with respect to all their claims 
and then follow the prescribed judicial review of the Commission’s decisions.   
III. The District Court Was Not Required To Analyze Each County Claim 
Independently. 
The district court was not required to provide a claim-by-claim analysis.  The 
Complaint contains eleven claims for relief, and each claim is centered on either the 
Threshold Law, Valuation Law or Allocation Law.  As the district court’s order indicates, 
the claims relating to the Threshold Law were dismissed as unripe, while the claims 
relating to the Valuation and Allocation Laws were dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.  (R. 911-15).  The Counties themselves made arguments to the 
district court that broadly encompassed all their claims; they did not analyze each claim 
independently.  (R. 356-73, 642-705).  And because the Counties did not address the 
motions to dismiss by independently analyzing each claim, the district court similarly 
was not required to do so. 
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IV. The Counties’ Claims Are Not Ripe. 
The Counties affirmatively declare that (1) their “claims are not dependent on the 
outcome of any specific assessment,” (2) this case is not a “property tax appeal,” and 
(3) they are not challenging “the assessed value of any airline.”  (Cty. Br., pp. 5, 21).  
However, these contentions conflict with the allegations of the Complaint.  (R. 1-30).  
And even if the Counties’ premises were deemed true, they confirm that the Counties’ 
claims are not ripe for review.  (R. 282-95, 461-76).  The Counties cannot satisfy the case 
and controversy requirement by introducing hypothetical examples concerning the 
application of the Challenged Statutes.  
To challenge a tax statute in Utah, a county must raise a justiciable controversy.  A 
claim for lost revenue with a demonstrated personal stake in the outcome must be based 
on an accrued state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts.  Under these 
principles, where the Counties’ claims do not arise from a disputed assessment of any 
particular airline, as they concede, then no justiciable case and controversy exists.  (Cty. 
Br., p. 5 (“[T]his case is not a ‘property tax appeal’ and it does not challenge the assessed 
value of any airline.”)).  The district court could not resolve the Counties’ constitutional 
claims without the factual allegations in the Complaint because, without more specific 
pleadings, the claims would not yet be justiciable.  The Counties are free to challenge the 
statutes whenever they can present an actual controversy based on concrete facts subject 
to the requirement that they also exhaust their administrative remedies. 
  8 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COUNTIES’ CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
A. How Utah’s Property Tax System Works.  
The Commission is one of the few remaining executive branch agencies created 
and delegated authority by the Utah Constitution.  See Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 6(3).5  
Section 6(3) directs the Commission to: 
(a) administer and supervise the State’s tax laws;  
(b) assess mines and public utilities and have such other 
powers of original assessment as the Legislature may 
provide by statute;  
(c) adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of 
property among the counties;  
(d) as the Legislature provides by statute . . . equalize the 
assessment and valuation of property within the counties; 
and  
(e) have other powers as may be provided by statute.  
 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 6(3) (emphasis added).   
 In addition to its authority to assess (value) the tangible taxable property of 
specified Utah taxpayers under subsection (3), the Commission is also the required 
beginning point of the constitutionally based process to adjudicate challenges to tax 
assessments.  See Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 6(4) (“Notwithstanding the powers granted to 
the State Tax Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by statute authorize 
any court established under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine 
any matter decided by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and taxation.”). 
                                              
5 Other constitutionally created executive branch agencies are (1) the Board of Pardons 
and Parole (Utah Const. Art. VII, § 12(1)), and (2) State Board & Education (Art. X, § 3). 
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The Commission also has a statutory duty to assess by May 1 of each year the 
property under its jurisdiction “at 100% of fair market value, as valued on January 1, in 
accordance with this chapter.”  Utah Code § 59-2-201(1) (emphasis added).  And “this 
chapter” includes the two “airline”-specific statutes challenged by the Counties—the 
Valuation Law (§ 59-2-201(4)) and the Allocation Law (§ 59-2-804).   
The Legislature and the citizens of Utah amended the Utah Constitution in 1998, 
changing Utah’s taxation and adjudication system.  Under these provisions, the 
Commission is intended, with respect to the property under its assessment jurisdiction, to 
be the initial and primary adjudicator of fair market value and determiner of property 
subject to taxation subject to the prescribed judicial review of its decisions.6 
Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 6(4) also authorizes the Legislature to establish a process 
for judicial review.  The Utah Legislature exercised this constitutional delegation in Utah 
Code § 59-1-601(1).  This section provides that “the district court shall have jurisdiction 
to review by trial de novo all decisions issued by the commission . . . [after July 1, 1994] 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.”  And this Court further implemented 
that constitutional directive by promulgating Rule 6-103 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, which provides:  “The Judicial Council shall formally designate at least 
three district court judges who volunteer as tax judges.”  Utah CJA Rule 6-103.  “Tax 
                                              
6 During the 1998 General Session of the Utah Legislature, Senate Joint Resolution No. 
13 was enacted.  See S.J. Res. 13, 1998 Leg. Sess.  This Resolution proposed to amend 
Art. XIII, § 6 (formerly section 11) of the Utah Constitution to allow for Art. VIII judges 
to review Commission decisions.  This proposition was included on the ballot as 
Proposition No. 6 and was passed by the citizens of the State at the 1998 General 
Election to take effect on January 1, 1999.  Id. 
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judges” are authorized to hear cases that include “appeals from and petitions for review 
of decisions of the Utah State Tax Commission.”7  Id. 
 For property under the Commission’s assessment jurisdiction (often referred to as 
“centrally” or “state” assessed properties), Utah’s property tax system operates as 
follows:  The Commission has delegated to its Property Tax Division (“Division”) the 
duty to prepare and issue assessments of the fair market value of these properties by May 
1 of each year.  See Utah Code § 59-2-201(1)(a); Utah Admin. Code r. R861-1A-16(1-4).  
Notice of the assessment is provided to the taxpayer and to each county in which the 
taxpayer has property.  See Utah Code § 59-2-201(1)(a) and (5).   
In 2017, a taxpayer could appeal the assessment by June 1 of that year.8  Subject 
to the provisions of § 59-2-1007(2), an affected County may appeal the assessment within 
30 days after a taxpayer files an appeal, or within 30 days of the last day on which a 
taxpayer could have filed an appeal.9  See Utah Code § 59-2-1007(2).  An appeal is made 
to the Commission which exercises its authority as a quasi-adjudicative body to hear and 
resolve the appeal.  See Utah Code § 59-2-1007(10-12).  Adjudicative proceedings before 
the Commission generally follow the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”); 
however, the Legislature (1) enacted special provisions in the UAPA dealing with tax 
matters, and (2) enacted special provisions in the tax code that apply to proceedings 
                                              
7 The district court judge in the court below on this appeal is not designated a tax judge. 
8 Utah Code § 59-2-1007 was amended in 2018.  The amendment changed the date from 
June 1 to on or before the later of August 1 or “90 days after the day on which the 
commission mails the notice of assessment.”  See Utah Code § 59-2-1007(1)(a)(i) and (ii) 
(2018). 
9 The same 2018 amendment also changed the County’s 30-day deadline to 60 days.  See 
Utah Code § 59-2-1007(2) (2018). 
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before the Commission.  The Commission has promulgated rules implementing the 
UAPA.  See Utah Code §§ 63G-4-102(2)(b); 59-1-601, 602, 604, 608, and 610; Utah 
Admin. Code r. R861-1A-22 through R861-1A-31. 
A party’s right to appeal a Commission decision is also provided in the tax code.    
If an annual assessment is not timely appealed, the assessment becomes final and no 
adjudicative proceeding is commenced.  If a taxpayer files a timely appeal, an affected 
County may intervene and participate as a party.  See Utah Code §§ 59-2-1007(2)(a); 59-
1-602(2).  A County may also directly appeal the assessment.  See Utah Code §§ 59-2-
1007(2)(b); 59-1-602(1)(a).  After the Commission fulfills its quasi-judicial role, a final 
decision rendered by the Commission is appealable by a taxpayer or a party County to 
either (1) a tax judge of the district court for a trial de novo, or (2) the Utah Supreme 
Court on the record created before the Commission at the formal adjudicative proceeding.  
See Utah Code §§ 59-1-602(1)(a), 59-1-601(1), 59-1-610(1); see also Utah Code § 78A-
3-102(3)(e)(ii) 
Although the Division is a party in adjudicative proceedings before the 
Commission and is represented by counsel, it is not authorized to appeal a final 
Commission decision; the Division, being subservient to its own agency, the 
Commission, is bound by the Commission’s final decision.  See Utah Code § 59-1-601 
and 602; Utah Admin. Code r. R861-1A-24(3)(a)(iv).  However, if a Commission 
decision is appealed by a taxpayer or a county, the Commission itself can appear as a 
party before the court to defend its appealed decision. 
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Commission orders appealed to a district court tax judge are reviewed de novo.  In 
its ruling, the court may “affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the 
commission, and shall grant other relief, invoke such other remedies, and issue such 
orders, in accordance with its decision, as appropriate.”  Utah Code. §§ 59-1-601(1-2) 
and 604. 
B. The Counties Are Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
In Utah, “parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite 
to seeking judicial review.”  Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 14, 34 
P.3d 180 (quoting State Tax Comm’n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989)).  
“Exceptions to this rule exist in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a 
likelihood that some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would be 
unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it appears that exhaustion 
would serve no useful purpose.”  Id. 
Here, the Counties do not argue that the exception provided for “unusual 
circumstances” is applicable, but argue it would serve no useful purpose.  However, the 
Counties themselves acknowledged the potential for dismissal for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies in their opposition to the State’s Motion to Dismiss.  (R. 370).  In 
response to the State’s argument that the Counties must challenge an actual tax 
assessment to create a justiciable case, the Counties argued: 
The State’s reference to certain appeals filed by one Plaintiff 
County is irrelevant to the State’s erroneous ‘ripeness’ 
arguments.  At best, the existing [sic] of pending appeals or 
‘objections’ would be relevant to an alleged failure to exhaust 
argument, which the State did not raise and did not brief. 
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(R. 370).  However, the Airlines’ Motion did “raise” and “brief” the “failure to exhaust 
argument.”  (R. 562-87; 715-31). 
No longer able to challenge the preservation of this issue, the Counties now ask to 
be excused from exhausting required administrative remedies, suggesting it will serve no 
purpose where the claims involve constitutional challenges.  (Cty. Br., pp. 22-25).  But 
this view is incorrect because (i) the administrative proceedings could obviate the 
Counties’ constitutional challenges; and (ii) administrative proceedings are needed to 
help frame and develop the factual issues before an appropriate court. 
(i) Administrative Proceedings Could Obviate the Counties’ 
Constitutional Claims. 
“Although the [Tax] Commission cannot determine questions of legality or 
constitutionality of legislative enactments, . . . the introduction of a constitutional issue 
does not necessarily avoid the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies.”  TDM, 
Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 2004 UT App 433, ¶ 4, 103 P.3d 190 (citations omitted); see also 
Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ¶ 18, 67 P.3d 466 (holding as incorrect the 
assertion “that administrative remedies need not be exhausted to pursue state 
constitutional claims”).  “Exhaustion of remedies is still required when the administrative 
proceeding may obviate the need to reach the constitutional question.”  TDM, 2004 UT 
App 433, ¶ 5 (emphasis added); see also Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 16 (“If an 
administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of the constitutional question, the 
administrative remedy plainly should be pursued.”).  Since there is a presumption a 
statute is constitutional, the Commission should conduct administrative proceedings in an 
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effort to resolve such appeals without reaching the constitutional issues.  See Salt Lake 
City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 21, --- P.3d --- (“All statutes are presumed to be constitutional 
and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving its invalidity.”) (citations 
omitted); see also Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan Cty., 681 P.2d 184, 191 (Utah 1984) 
(“The presumption of constitutionality applies with particular force to tax statutes.”).  
Contrary to the Counties’ assertion, Utah law does not require the Airlines to predict 
outcomes and show that an administrative proceeding before the Commission will 
obviate the need to reach the constitutional question; the mere possibility is enough to 
require exhaustion.  See Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 16.   
In Nebeker, the plaintiff claimed that the imposition of interest on a fuel tax 
deficiency assessed by the Commission was unconstitutional.  Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 7.  
The district court dismissed plaintiff’s petition for failing to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued that exhaustion served no useful purpose 
“because the only claims he raised before the district court were constitutional.”  Id. at 
¶¶ 12 and 15.  This Court affirmed and required the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative 
remedies because a decision by the Commission “could have determined” the imposition 
of interest “was unwarranted.”  Id. at ¶ 17 (emphasis added). 
As in Nebeker, a decision by the Commission with respect to the Valuation and 
Allocation Laws raised in the four pending County appeals of airline assessments, could 
leave no remnant of the constitutional challenges.  For example, the Counties do not 
challenge the constitutionality of using the Airliner Price Guide as an accepted 
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methodology for determining fair market value. 10  Instead, they argue that § 59-2-201(4) 
is unconstitutional because (1) the statute makes this valuation method the primary 
valuation method used by the Commission, (2) of the fleet discount provided in the 
Airliner Price Guide, and (3) of the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard.  (R. 1-
30).  The Counties further claim that the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard 
prevents the Commission from finding fair market value in all instances based on a 
“preponderance of the evidence.”  (R. 22).  But the Counties’ argument is based on 
unproven factual and legal assumptions that the Airlines dispute.   
For example, without factual findings and a final adjudicative decision by the 
Commission concerning implementation of the Challenged Statutes and of the fair market 
value of airline property, a court cannot determine the validity of the claim that “the clear 
and convincing standard is difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy.”  (R. 22).  The Counties 
ignore, among other likelihoods, that the Commission may conclude that the Counties do 
not have sufficient evidence of an undervaluation of airline property under any 
evidentiary standard.  As fundamental, the Commission may conclude that, contrary to 
the Counties’ construction, the plain language of § 59-2-201(4)(d) does not require the 
Commission to use clear and convincing evidence to determine fair market value, but 
only to determine if the “values reflected in the aircraft pricing guide do not reasonably 
                                              
10 With respect to the March 19, 2009 Commission case referenced and attached as 
Exhibit 8 to the Counties’ Complaint (Tax Commission Appeal No. 06-0725), it was Salt 
Lake County that actively participated in that administrative appeal, engaged the 
publisher of the Airliner Price Guide as its expert witness, and advocated for the use of 
that Guide as the exclusive valuation methodology for airline mobile flight equipment. 
(See R. 210-12). 
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reflect fair market value of the aircraft.”  See Utah Code § 59-2-201(4)(d)(i) (emphasis 
added); (Cty. Br., pp. 4, 19-23).11 
The Commission could also avoid the constitutional challenge to the Allocation 
Law by applying the provisions of a federal statute in 49 U.S.C. § 40116, regarding state 
taxation.  Section 40116 provides that “[a] State or [County] may levy or collect tax on or 
related to a flight of a commercial aircraft or an activity or service on the aircraft only if 
the aircraft takes off or lands in the State or [County] as part of the flight.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 40116(c) (emphasis added).  The Commission could conclude that federal law prohibits 
the taxation of “flyover” aircraft and that federal law supersedes state law.  Thus, in light 
of these and other real possibilities, the constitutional challenges could be rendered moot 
by adjudication of these claims before the Commission.  Without an evidentiary hearing, 
the Commission would not be able to identify what portion of airline property is not 
being taxed, if any, and whether the State has a sufficient nexus with any such property to 
subject it to taxation in Utah. 
1. The Complaint alleges “as-applied” facts and claims, not just 
facial challenges. 
 
The Counties also attempt to avoid the exhaustion issue outright by diverting 
attention to their “facial” challenges while fundamentally ignoring their multiple “as-
                                              
11 Regardless how the Commission applies Section 59-2-201(4)(d), if the Commission 
determines there is insufficient proof to overcome the Division’s assessment of an 
airline’s mobile flight equipment under the applicable standard of proof, the Counties 
could appeal the decision to the District Court’s Tax Division for a de novo review, 
where they could assert their argument.  See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm’n, 2011 UT 28, ¶¶ 16-18, 254 P.3d 752 (if petitioner appeals to the District Court 
Tax Division under § 59-1-601, they are “entitled to a de novo proceeding to determine 
property value in which no deference is given to the previous Commission decision.”).   
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applied” challenges.  (Cty. Br., pp. 17-25).  They suggest the Complaint involves “pure 
legal threshold questions” and that “none of the Counties’ claims in this appeal involve 
administrative claims or require administrative determinations that would obviate the 
constitutional issues.”  (Cty. Br., pp. 6, 16, 19, 22-23, 25). 
The Complaint undermines these characterizations.  A survey of the Complaint’s 
allegations brings to light that, in fact, the Counties contest the application of the 
Challenged Statutes.  (R. 1-30).12  The Complaint offers sweeping allegations of “fact”, 
especially in framing the claim that the Challenged Statutes will force the Commission to 
value airline property of all airlines below fair market value: 
5. The Challenged Laws violate important principles of due 
process, equal protection, uniformity, and fairness . . . . For 
example, if the tax shift from one Centrally Assessed industry 
is $5 million per year, then individual and small business 
taxpayers will collectively pay $5 million more, in perpetuity, 
to make up that difference. 
 
11. [The Challenged Laws] result[] in property and value 
escaping taxation.     
 
59. [The Challenged Laws decrease by 39% the] “taxable 
values for the seven major passenger airlines . . . .”  
 
                                              
12 The Counties are not entirely candid in saying that they do not challenge “the assessed 
value of any airline.”  (Cty. Br., p. 5).  Rather, their claims categorically challenge the 
assessed property values of ALL airlines.  (R. 1-30).  The Counties in their memorandum 
opposing the State’s Motion stated that: “[The] Counties’ as-applied challenge relies not 
on specific decisions made for specific taxpayers based on specific and unique facts, but 
instead in the impact of SB157 on the 2017 airline assessments industry-wide.  
Specifically, application of SB157 in 2017 resulted in the Commission being required to 
value airlines at an average of approximately 39% less than what their values would have 
been using 2016 methods . . . for a total loss in airline tax revenues of what Plaintiff 
Counties contend was approximately $5 million in 2017 alone.”  (R. 367) (emphasis in 
original).  
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60. [Without the Challenged laws,] the 2017 Utah taxable 
values for the seven major airlines would be on average 43% 
higher. 
 
74. [U]se of the Section 59-2-804 allocation results 
in . . . taxable property and its value not being allocated to 
any taxing jurisdiction, including Utah. 
 
91. [Section 59-2-201(4)] prevents a finding of fair market 
value . . . .  
 
92. [Section 59-2-201(4)] facially violates Utah Constitution 
Article XIII, section 2(1) by preventing fair market value due 
to the Clear and Convincing Threshold. 
 
93. [Section 59-2-201(4)] violates Utah Constitution Article 
XIII, section 2(1) as applied because fair market value is not 
reached . . .  . 
 
103. Utah Code section 59-2-201(4)’s 20% Discount does not 
result in fair market value. 
 
113. The ‘revenue ton miles factor’ set forth in Utah Code 
section 59-2-804 results in an allocation of less than 1 (or 
100%), if applied uniformly by all taxing jurisdictions, which 
leaves property and value untaxed . . . . 
 
(See also ¶¶ 4, 6-9, 36-39, 41, 73, 90, 101, 104, and 115).  (R. 1-30). 
Thus, contrary to the Counties’ contention, the Complaint does not simply raise 
“pure legal threshold questions”; the Complaint’s factual allegations are inherent in, and 
intertwined with, all of the Counties’ constitutional claims, whether facial or as-applied.  
And to develop these claims, factual findings by the Commission are required.  By 
putting these facts at issue in the Complaint, the Counties cannot disavow them now in a 
bid to avoid the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. 
  19 
SLC_3972021 
In fact, the Counties acknowledged this in their opposition to the State’s Motion 
which recognized the need for factual development and argued that the ripeness 
requirement had been met ostensibly because 
[a]ll of the challenged laws are in force, have been applied, 
and have had real world effects on taxpayers.  SB157 required 
the Commission to use a new valuation standard for 2017, 
which it did, resulting in significantly lower values for 
airlines.  However, regardless of the result, SB157 is in full 
force and effect on the Commission and the Commission has 
no choice but to apply the statute, which it did when issuing 
the 2017 assessments.  The controversy over SB157 is 
anything but hypothetical. 
 
(R. 372) (emphasis added).  The Airlines disagree with these characterizations and denied 
them in their Answer.  The Airlines are entitled to defend against these allegations.  
However, it is clear that the Counties’ underlying claims are fact dependent and require 
factual development.  And to resolve these claims, the following facts, among others, 
must be developed: (1) whether the 2017 values of all airlines are “significantly lower,” 
and if so, by how much; and (2) what are the actual “real world effects on taxpayers.”  
Missing from the Counties’ rudimentary and unproven estimates, assumptions, 
hypotheticals and comparisons, is the necessary level of factual development to allow for 
proper adjudication of the Counties’ constitutional challenges. 
Finally, the Counties acknowledged below in their opposition memorandum to the 
State’s Motion that their “claims challenge the constitutionality of the Challenged 
Law . . . as applied.”  (R. 649).  They cannot deny this premise now to sidestep the 
exhaustion requirement.  Indeed, “as-applied” constitutional challenges require factual 
determinations.  See 
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(“When asserting an as-applied challenge, the party claims that, under the facts of his 
particular case, the statute was applied . . . in an unconstitutional manner.”) (citing 
Sanjour v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 56 F.3d 85, 92 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating an “as-
applied” challenge “ask[s] only that the reviewing court declare the challenged statute or 
regulation unconstitutional on the facts of the particular case.”) (emphasis added)).  
These authorities instruct that the Counties’ “as-applied” challenges cannot be decided in 
a vacuum; factual determinations are required to provide the predicate to properly 
adjudicate them. 
2. The Commission (not the district court) is initially responsible for 
developing the facts. 
 
The Constitution grants to the Commission—not the district court—the initial and 
primary jurisdiction and duty to develop and adjudicate the facts, and it created a sound 
and sufficient judicial review process to review Commission decisions.  And as discussed 
above, the Commission’s ruling under this system could obviate the need to reach the 
Counties’ constitutional challenges.  (See pp. 13-14, supra).  For example, the 
Commission could conclude that the Division fairly determined the fair market value of 
mobile flight equipment (i.e. aircraft) by applying the challenged statutes.  The 
Commission could also rule that a different valuation is warranted if the petitioner 
(whether a county or taxpayer) in any appeal satisfies the requisite burden of proof.  
Thus, whether all of the Counties’ constitutional issues will remain “regardless of any 
affirmative action or inaction by the Commission,” is far from clear.  (Cty. Br., p. 10). 
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3. Fact finding is not the province of this Court. 
The Counties also contend—without authority—that “[a]ny factual findings that 
could conceivably assist in framing or developing the validity of the statutes, therefore, 
are squarely within the province of this Court.”  (Cty. Br., p. 25).  This misstates the law 
and ignores the constitutionally-mandated review process.  The Constitution authorizes 
the Commission to be the first forum to adjudicate factual disputes relating to valuation 
and assessment of taxpayer property.  See Utah Code § 59-1-210(4), (7).  After a 
Commission ruling, courts have authority to “adjudicate, review, reconsider, or 
redetermine any matter decided by the State Tax Commission relating to revenue and 
taxation.”  Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 6(4).13  Under Utah’s constitutional tax system, if the 
Commission is unable to resolve the legal issues, or if the Counties disagree with the 
Commission’s decision, the Counties will have preserved their issues and may appeal for 
de novo review by a tax judge in the district court, as they correctly did in the other 
pending matters (see note 2, p. 2, supra), or appeal directly to this Court on the 
                                              
13 Though the Commission cannot decide “threshold” constitutional questions, even the 
Counties acknowledged the Commission has been granted exclusive jurisdiction “for the 
assessment of property”—a factual underpinning to their constitutional challenges.  
(R. 658).  To the extent the Commission would be able to apply applicable law (including 
constitutional principles) in such a way as to avoid deciding constitutional questions, it 
should be allowed to fulfill its constitutional and statutory mandates.  See Johnson v. 
Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980) (“Administrative agencies do 
not generally determine the constitutionality of their organic legislation.  But the mere 
introduction of a constitutional issue does not obviate the need for exhaustion of 
administrative remedies[,] if an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of the 
constitutional question, the administrative remedy plainly should be pursued.”) (citations 
omitted); see also West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994) 
(demonstrating “adherence to the general rule that courts should avoid reaching 
constitutional issues if the case can be decided on other grounds”) .  
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administrative record.  See Utah Code §§ 59-1-602(1)(a), 59-1-601(1), 59-1-610(1).  This 
mandated process applies to each of the Counties’ constitutional challenges. 
In sum, “because the court need not accept legal conclusions as true” on a motion 
to dismiss or on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,14 and because the Complaint 
raises both fact and legal questions, the Counties must exhaust their remedies before the 
Commission—before requesting judicial review—in order to resolve their constitutional 
claims.  The district court correctly agreed. 
(ii) The District Court Properly Found that Administrative Proceedings 
are Needed to Help Frame and Develop the Factual Issues before the 
Appropriate Tribunal. 
The Counties also raise facial constitutional claims to the Challenged Statutes.  
(Cty. Br., pp. 17-25).  But “[e]ven if the constitutional issue is not avoided entirely, an 
administrative proceeding may be useful to better frame the issues before the court.”  
TDM, 2004 UT App 433, ¶ 5.  This is particularly so under the specific (and 
constitutionally required) adjudicative judicial review procedures for tax appeals from the 
Commission. 
The Commission is unlike most other state agencies in that it is created and 
empowered by the Utah Constitution.  See Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 6(4).  And it is 
required to comply with constitutional mandates concerning “fair market value,” 
“uniform and equal” assessments of tangible property, and the taxation of all tangible 
property.  Utah Const. Art. XIII §6.  The Commission has been appointed to administer 
and supervise the State’s tax laws and is most qualified to ensure these mandates are met. 
                                              
14 See Biedermaann v. Wasatch Cty., 2015 UT App 274, ¶ 11, 362 P.3d 287. 
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The Counties assert that the “airline valuation” statute undervalues airline mobile 
flight equipment, and that they will always struggle to prove this to the Commission 
under the system currently “provided by law” which, they say, requires “clear and 
convincing” evidence of fair market value.  (R. 13-17).  In order to establish that the 
“airline valuation” statute unconstitutionally undervalues mobile flight equipment, the 
Counties must prove that airline mobile flight equipment is, in fact, undervalued.  This 
cannot be determined without an evidentiary hearing regarding the 2017 assessments.  
Conducting such an evidentiary hearing, and making determinations of fair market value, 
are the province of the Commission in the first instance, not a court’s.  Courts are 
constitutionally and statutorily empowered to “review” the Commission’s determinations.  
See Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 6(4); Utah Code §§ 59-1-601(1); 59-1-602. 
Each property tax year stands on its own, and property values often change from 
year-to-year.  Thus, it is insufficient for the Counties to suggest that values reflected in 
the 2017 assessments are below “fair market value” just because the 2016 values for the 
property of the same mobile flight equipment (as assessed by the Commission) were 
higher, or that the 2017 assessments would allegedly be higher if the 2016 valuation 
methodology were used.  (R. 3-4, 11, 20).  These postulates pre-suppose: (1) that the 
2016 assessments of airline mobile flight equipment accurately reflected fair market 
value; (2) that the 2017 assessments of mobile flight equipment do not reflect the fair 
market value of the equipment as of January 1, 2017; (3) that the Valuation Law does not 
better reflect fair market value of the mobile flight equipment; (4) that the type, number, 
age, and condition of the mobile flight equipment assessed in 2016 are the same as those 
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assessed in 2017; (5) that the value of mobile flight equipment does not change from 
year-to-year; (6) that the Division would have used the same methodologies, and to the 
same extent for each airline, as it did in 2016; and (7) that any difference in value of such 
equipment between 2016 and 2017 is due exclusively to the use of a different valuation 
methodology and not, for instance, due to changes in the age and condition of equipment, 
changes in technology or changed economic conditions.  All this underscores that “fair 
market value” is a fact question.  See T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2011 UT 28, ¶ 49 (“The choice 
of a valuation methodology and the resulting fair market value are questions of 
fact . . . .”).  The Commission is constitutionally appointed to make the initial factual 
determination of fair market value of airline property. 
Fact questions are also raised by the Counties’ disputed claim that the Allocation 
Law incorrectly permits some airline property to avoid being taxed.  (R. 17-19).  The 
Airlines view this differently.  The Airlines assert that section 59-2-804 fairly allocates an 
appropriate portion of their property to the State of Utah.  Given this disagreement, a 
factual determination needs to be made to identify what, if any, property has not been 
fully taxed, and whether that property is subject to taxation under Utah law.  Tax nexus 
and the situs of property for tax purposes requires a factual determination to ascertain 
whether an airline’s property has sufficient physical presence in and “contacts” with a 
taxing jurisdiction.  See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Prop. Tax Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm’n, 1999 UT 41, ¶ 25, 979 P.2d 346.  The Commission remains the entity 
constitutionally responsible to determine in the first instance what property is subject to 
taxation. 
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The Counties argue that each of the Challenged Laws violate uniformity 
requirements of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution.  (Cty. Br., pp. 4, 19-22).  But this 
argument necessarily raises a factual question of fair market value because “uniformity is 
satisfied when the property valuation is made at fair market value” and 
“the . . . determination of fair market value . . . is a question of fact.  See Nelson v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 943 P.2d 1354, 1357 (Utah 1997); see also Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co. v. 
State Tax Comm’n, 1999 UT 90, ¶ 13, 987 P.2d 594.  This supports the need for the 
Counties to exhaust their administrative remedies. 
The Airlines agree with the State:  “Contrary to [the Counties’] assertion, [the 
State] is not arguing that Plaintiffs may never challenge the statutes at issue, or that 
Plaintiffs’ claims—if stated in terms of an actual assessment—could not state claims 
upon which relief may be granted.”  (R. 463).  Rather, the Counties may challenge the 
statutes on appeal from the Commission to the tax court or to this Court.  But this is not 
the course the Counties have followed here.  The Counties have ignored the mandated 
system and their Complaint was correctly dismissed.  The Counties’ efforts to circumvent 
this system should be rejected so the Counties’ allegations of unconstitutionality may be 
properly and fully developed, resolved, mooted, or otherwise disposed of by the 
Commission, subject to judicial review, in the manner provided by law. 
Finally, if this Court recognizes, as the district court did, that the Counties’ claims 
involve both facial and as-applied theories, then the Court should affirm the dismissal for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  See TDM, 2004 UT App 433, ¶ 5 (“Even if 
the constitutional issue is not avoided entirely, an administrative proceeding may be 
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useful to better frame the issues before the court.”).  Even absent an “as-applied” 
component, strict facial constitutional challenges cause judicial concern.  See, e.g., State 
v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ¶ 31, 100 P.3d 231 (holding “courts [should] adopt a 
‘skeptical approach’” to facial challenges because “facial adjudication carries too much 
promise of premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually bare-bones 
records”); see also State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 50, 993 P.2d 854 (“Facial challenges 
succeed, however, only if the statutes at issue are incapable of any valid application.”). 
II. THE CASES PENDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT DO NOT SATISFY 
THE CASE AND CONTROVERSY AND EXHAUSTION 
REQUIREMENTS. 
The Counties identify four separate administrative cases which Appellant Salt 
Lake County appealed to the district court concerning the Threshold Law.  These appeals 
followed the correct constitutional and statutory procedure to challenge a Commission 
tax assessment and to review a Commission decision, and have now been assigned to a 
tax court judge.  (Cty. Br., pp. 23-25).  Referring to these cases, the Counties suggest that 
they make application of the exhaustion requirement “senseless” here.  (Cty. Br., p. 23).  
They go further and claim “there is no administrative remedy to exhaust because the 
statute under challenge prevents administrative adjudication in the first instance.”  (Cty. 
Br., pp. 23-24).  First, the Counties make this argument broadly, but fail to make clear 
that the cases currently pending in the district court only involve the Threshold Law, but 
not the Valuation and Allocation Laws, which remain as issues before the Commission in 
four other administrative appeals.   
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Second, Salt Lake County has already exhausted its administrative remedies in the 
four cases pending in the district court.  The Division’s motions for summary judgment 
were argued and decided by the Commission as a matter of law on undisputed facts.  No 
further factual development was required for the Commission to enter its decision.  Thus, 
the Counties cannot argue here that exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to 
the Threshold Law in the administrative cases on appeal in the district court, somehow 
vicariously excuses the Counties from their exhaustion requirement relating to the 
Valuation and Allocation Laws that are still pending and awaiting factual development 
before the Commission.  And for the reasons discussed in Part IV, infra, the 
administrative cases on appeal do not vicariously create a case and controversy in the 
instant case. 
The four administrative cases pending in the district court were all commenced 
before the Commission, all following the correct process contemplated by the Utah 
Constitution, the statutes, and related court rules governing appeals from Commission 
decisions.  Like those cases, the issues raised in the Counties’ Complaint in this case 
should have been pursued in the Commission for required factual development.  This is 
the Commission’s role.  (See pp. 8-12, supra).  And until the Commission has fulfilled 
that role by determining the proper valuation and allocation of airline property, the 
Counties cannot argue they have exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to 
all of their claims.  Accordingly, the four cases pending before the district court do not 
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excuse the Counties from satisfying the exhaustion requirement with respect to the 
Challenged Laws or otherwise impact this Court’s decision.15 
The pendency of the district court cases, however, raises a question:  why are the 
Counties prolonging resolution of the Threshold Law issue by filing this appeal when the 
same issue has been properly framed in the district court since April 2018?  This question 
also extends to the four other administrative appeals pending before the Commission (the 
proper forum for factual development) regarding the Valuation and Allocation Laws.16  
Why aren’t the Counties pursuing their constitutional claims there?  The Counties have 
correctly followed the prescribed administrative process with respect to the other 
administrative cases that are now appealed to the district court, as Utah’s Constitution 
and statutes contemplate.  In all events, the Counties should not be allowed to leapfrog 
that process here by asserting unsubstantiated claims of unconstitutionality.  Affirming 
the district court’s dismissal allows the Counties to fully adjudicate their claims by 
following the administrative process before the Commission, as they have in the other 
cases. 
                                              
15 If, as the Counties suggest, no administrative remedy is available (and the existence of 
the pending district court cases confirms that an appropriate remedy exists), remanding 
this case to the district court could also spawn an impermissible risk of inconsistent 
decisions in simultaneous parallel judicial actions involving the same constitutional issue 
and almost the same parties.  See McRae & DeLand v. Feltch, 669 P.2d 404, 405 (Utah 
1983) (“[J]urisdiction of a declaratory judgment will not be entertained if there is at the 
time of the commencement of the declaratory action another action or proceeding to 
which the same persons are parties, in which are involved and may be adjudicated the 
identical issues that are involved in the declaratory action.”).  Courts endeavor to avoid 
this.  Cf. Beaver Cty. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2010 UT 50, 254 P.3d 158. 
16 See, e.g., note 2, p. 2, supra. 
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III. A DISMISSAL RULING NEED NOT ANALYZE EACH COUNTY CLAIM 
INDEPENDENTLY. 
The Counties assign error to the district court for not analyzing each claim 
separately.  (Cty. Br., pp. 16-17).  But the Counties overlook that, with one exception,17 
each dismissed claim is directly linked to the Threshold Law, Valuation Law or 
Allocation Law.  (R. 20-27).  Claims relating to the Threshold Law were dismissed as 
unripe and claims relating to the Valuation and Allocation Laws were dismissed for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  (R. 911-15).  The district court was not 
therefore also required to give a claim-by-claim analysis. 
The district court’s ruling was consistent with the manner by which the Counties’ 
briefed and orally argued their case below.  The Counties made general arguments that 
grouped all their claims; they did not analyze each claim independently.  (R. 356-73, 642-
705).  The district court was not itself required to undertake a claim-by-claim analysis. 
The Counties cite Nurse & Griffin Ins. Agency v. Erie Ins. Group, 1999 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4992 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) for the proposition that it was error for the district 
court to dismiss claims as a group on exhaustion grounds when some claims, they 
contend, did not require exhaustion.  (Cty. Br., pp. 16-17).  Even if this Ohio case 
                                              
17 The Counties’ Sixth Claim for Relief concerns the violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine.  (R. 25).  And because the Counties have not adequately briefed that issue on 
appeal, it is not before the Court.  See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
(“Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development of 
that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority . . . [and] this court is not a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.”  
(quotations and citations omitted); see also Cox v. Cox, 2003 WL21543810, *2 (Utah Ct. 
App. July 3, 2003) (holding courts “will consider an issue inadequately briefed when the 
overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument 
to [the] court.”) (citations omitted). 
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applied, the Counties’ do not identify on appeal which claims they believe do not require 
exhaustion.  As in the district court, the Counties simply conclude that “the claims for 
relief are not of the type which are cognizable before the Tax Commission nor do they 
require administrative review subjecting them to dismissal.”  (Cty. Br., p. 17).  This falls 
short of a claim-by-claim argument. 
Moreover, the record of the parties’ pleadings and motions supplies additional 
foundation for the district court’s ruling.  (R. 1-30, 260-71, 282-95, 356-73, 461-76, 562-
87, 610-22, 642-705, 715-31, 791-99, 803-09, 813-22).  This Court may affirm on any 
basis finding support in the record.  See State v. Van Huizen, 2019 UT 01, ¶39, ---P.3d --- 
(“[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).  The district 
court’s ruling was proper. 
IV. THE COUNTIES’ CLAIMS ARE NOT RIPE. 
The Counties say their “claims are not dependent on the outcome of any specific 
assessment,” that this case is not a “property tax appeal,” and that they are not 
challenging “the assessed value of any airline.”  (Cty. Br., pp. 5, 21).  However, these 
contentions conflict with the allegations of the Complaint.  (R. 1-30); (see also pp. 15-17, 
supra).  And even if the Counties’ premises were deemed true, they confirm that the 
Counties’ claims are not ripe for review.  (R. 282-95, 461-76).  Thus, even if the Counties 
are not required to exhaust their administrative remedies, the Counties cannot satisfy the 
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case and controversy requirement by merely introducing hypothetical examples 
concerning the application of the Challenged Statutes. 18 
To challenge a tax statute in Utah, a county must: 
produce a tax assessment that has been challenged and 
reduced under the [challenged statute] with a resulting loss of 
revenue to the relevant county.  In the absence of such a 
reduced assessment, [the court’s] hands are tied because a 
justiciable controversy necessarily involves an accrued state 
of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts. 
 
Salt Lake Cty. v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996); (see also note 18, p. 31, 
supra).  Without a justiciable controversy, courts do not acknowledge jurisdiction for a 
case, as this Court previously explained: 
One of our earliest explications of justiciability noted that 
“[e]ven courts of general jurisdiction have no power to decide 
abstract questions or to render declaratory judgments, in the 
absence of an actual controversy directly involving rights.”  
We have since reiterated that when a court ascertains that 
there is no jurisdiction in the court because of the absence of 
a justiciable controversy, then the court can go no further, and 
its immediate duty is to dismiss the action.  Thus, we have 
unequivocally declared that courts are not a forum for hearing 
academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions. 
 
Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 19, 289 
P.3d 582 (citing Univ. of Utah v. Indus. Comm’n of Utah, 229 P. 1103, 1104 (Utah 
1924)) (additional citation omitted); see also Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 
                                              
18 See also Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 
UT 51, ¶ 40, 238 P.3d 1054 (“A dispute is ripe when a conflict over the application of a 
legal provision has sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and 
obligations between the parties thereto.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see 
also Boyle v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(“Therefore, because of the hypothetical nature of plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment 
action . . . as a matter of law . . .the action [is] not ripe for adjudication.”). 
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